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COMMENT
EDMUND B. SPAETH, JR.t
Professor Lerman's principal indictment of lawyers is that when
they bill their clients, they lie about the extent of their services.' Her
response is to suggest a detailed new rule on billing-very detailed;
it would, for example, regulate when a time charge could and could
not be rounded to a quarter of an hour.2 It is not apparent from
Professor Lerman's discussion, however, either that a detailed new
rule is needed, or that she is warranted in her evident belief that
enacting new, more detailed rules will improve professional conduct.
After criticizing the current rules of professional conduct, Pro-
fessor Lerman states that "except in certain narrow circumstances
(such as handling client funds or engaging in business transactions
with clients) the drafters [of the Model Rules3 and Model Code4 ]
appear to assume that lawyers are always honest with their clients
and that regulation is not needed in this area." 5 To charge a lawyer
with naivete is almost as harsh as charging corruption. Examination
of the Model Rules and Model Code, however, provides a sufficient
answer to the charge.
A lawyer who agrees to bill on a time-spent basis, and then pads
the bill, is not charging a "reasonable" fee, as required by Model
Rule 1.5; nor has the lawyer kept the client "reasonably informed
about the status of [the] matter," "compl[ied] with reasonable
requests for information," or "explain[ed] [the] matter to the extent
necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding
the representation, " as required by Model Rule 1.4. Also, Model
Rule 4. 1(a) forbids a lawyer to "make a false statement of material
fact... to a third person," and a lawyer's duty of candor cannot be
less demanding when the lawyer is making a statement to a client.
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1 See Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 659, 705-20 (1990).
2 See id. at 751 (Lerman's proposed Model Rule 1.5(0(4)).
3 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983) [hereinafter MODEL RULE].
4 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1981) [hereinafter MODEL
CODE].
5 Lerman, supra note 1, at 695-96.
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And finally, Model Rule 8.4(c) forbids a lawyer to "engage in con-
duct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation." The
Model Code has similar provisions (DR 2-106, on fees, and DR 1-
102, on dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation). The ade-
quacy of these provisions may be tested by imagining the response of
a disciplinary authority to a lawyer's argument that no rule forbids a
padded bill.
At this point, comment should perhaps end. For one who
argues for a new rule should at least show that the current rules do
not cover the subject. Professor Lerman's article, however, raises
other questions, broader than the question of the need for her pro-
posed new rule on billing.
Assuming that Professor Lerman has shown that her suggested
new rules would fill a gap in the present rules, the question remains
whether the new rules would be enforced. Professor Lerman
declines to answer this question as beyond the scope of her article,
stating instead that her section on 'Regulating Deception' "focuses
on what the standards should be, not on how to get people to comply
with them."6 Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to suppose that Pro-
fessor Lerman thinks that there are, or will be, ways "to get people to
comply with" the new rules she suggests. Otherwise, why would she
suggest them? It is therefore striking to encounter elsewhere in her
article evidence that she has very little faith that the current rules are
enforced.
She has no faith in the profession's self-regulatory mechanisms.
In her view, the attitude of the bar is one of "general unconcern
about lawyer honesty with clients"; 7 her view of the drafters of the
Model Rules and Model Code has already been indicated. While she
regards consumer law as having "enormous potential to increase the
honesty of lawyers," she acknowledges that "courts have only
recently begun to apply consumer law to lawyer misconduct,"' and
she discusses neither the difficulties nor the likelihood of the poten-
6 Id. at 749.
7 Id. at 693. Many, perhaps most, lawyers would agree that state disciplinary
agencies need strengthening. See generally COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONALISM,
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ".... IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICES": A BLUEPRINT
FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM 45-46 (1986); see also AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY
ENFORCEMENT, PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 1-9
(1970) (Final Draft 1970). The tone of Professor Lerman's criticism is so dismissive,
however, as to suggest that she regards any attempt to strengthen disciplinary
agencies as futile.
8 Lerman, supra nte 1, at 699.
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tial she envisages being realized. As for malpractice, "[it] may deter
some lawyer misconduct, but the remedy is not available to most
deceived clients." 9 Still, she has some hope that developments in
malpractice law will lead to better enforcement of rules of conduct.
Thus, after observing that "judges are relying increasingly on the
codes in malpractice cases,"' 0 she states: "This coalescence of mal-
practice law and disciplinary law is a positive development."'"
At least some will doubt whether such a development is positive.
To hold that a lawyer may be liable for damages in a malpractice
action for violation of a rule of professional conduct is to hold that
the standard imposed on the lawyer's conduct by the rule is the same
as the standard imposed by the law of negligence. This may present
no difficulty. Certainly it is a violation both of Model. Rule 1.1,
requiring competence, and of the law of negligence to miss a statute
of limitations. The danger, however, which Professor Lerman does
not acknowledge, is that the greater the coalescence of the rules of
conduct and the law of negligence, the greater the pressure to nar-
row the rules-to make them incorporate only the law of negligence,
to the exclusion of any higher standard of conduct.
This narrowing process may be seen at work if one examines, as
Professor Schneyer has recently done,12 the evolution of the Model
Rules. For example, the Discussion Draft version of Rule 1.1, con-
cerning lawyer competence, provided that a lawyer should work only
on matters in which the lawyer could "act with adequate compe-
tence," i.e., the competence displayed in "acceptable practice by law-
yers undertaking similar matters."' 3  Professor Schneyer's
examination of the Kutak Commission's deliberations disclosed that
"this language was dropped. The Commission feared that the provi-
sion would invite malpractice litigation, and wanted especially to
protect sole practitioners and small town lawyers, who are not apt to
specialize."' 4  Similarly, "efficiency" was dropped as an aspect of
competence when the ABA Standing Committee on Lawyer's Profes-
sional Liability complained that its inclusion was likely to result in
malpractice claims. 15 Indeed, Professor Schneyer found that the
9 Id. at 698.
10 Id. at 748.
"1 Id.
12 See Schneyer, Professionalism as Bar Politics: The Making of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, 14 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 677 (1989).
13 MODEL RULE Rule 1.1 (Discussion Draft 1980).
14 Schneyer, supra note 12, at 727.
15 See id.
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Committee on Professional Liability "went through the Proposed
Final Draft with a risk manager's fine-tooth comb and found a
number of disturbing provisions."
'
"6
This experience with the making of the Model Rules suggests
that the chance of Professor Lerman's proposed new rules being
approved is slim-which may not concern her but nevertheless does
seem relevant in considering any proposed new rule. Beyond this
consideration of practicality, however, lies another, more fundamen-
tal, question, which is whether the rules of professional conduct
should be narrowed to the point where they do no more than recite
minimum standards of conduct that if satisfied will protect a lawyer
against a malpractice action.
The belief that rules of conduct should state more than mini-
mum standards is most clearly embodied in the Model Code, with its
distinction between Disciplinary Rules, for the violation of which a
lawyer may be disciplined, and Ethical Considerations, which
describe standards to which a lawyer should aspire in the hope of
becoming not merely a lawyer who will escape discipline but one
who will realize the ideals of the legal profession. 17 While the Model
Rules abandoned this distinction between Disciplinary Rules and
Ethical Considerations, they nevertheless recognize that a lawyer's
personal standards may lead the lawyer to conduct beyond that
required to comply with the minimum standards imposed by the
Rules. This recognition is manifested in two aspects of the Model
Rules.
First, the Model Rules respond to the criticism that the Model
Code at least encouraged, if it did not oblige, all lawyers to act as
zealous advocates-less elegantly described as "hired guns." Thus,
the Model Rules recognize that lawyers act not only as advocates
18
but as advisors," intermediaries," and partners and supervisors of
16 Id.
17 For the classic discussion of the relationship of aspirational standards and
minimum standards, the violation of which calls for discipline, see Frankel, Book
Review, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 874, 877-82 (1976) (reviewing the Code of Professional
Responsibility). For a collection of excerpts from representative essays and a
bibliography on professional associations and professional autonomy, see G. HAZARD
& D. RHODE, THE LEGAL PROFESSION: RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION 79-115 (2d
ed. 1988). For a discussion of professionalism with particular reference to corporate
lawyers, see Simon, Babbitt v. Brandeis: The Decline of the Professional Ideal, 37 STAN. L.
REV. 565, 571-76 (1985); see also C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 68-78 (1986)
(compact discussion of legal ethics and moral philosophy).
18 See MODEL RULES 3.1 - 3.9.
19 See MODEL RULE 2.1.
20 See MODEL RULE 2.2.
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other lawyers2 1 and of nonlawyer assistants,22 with responsibilities
distinctive to each role.
Second, as Professor Schneyer has properly emphasized, in his
description of the making of the Model Rules, the Model Rules:
invite lawyers in any role to take their own values into account.
They permit lawyers to refuse on moral grounds to represent
would-be clients [citing Model Rule 6.2 Comment (no duty to rep-
resent any particular client)]; authorize lawyers to "limit the objec-
tives" of representation by excluding client aims they find
"repugnant or imprudent" [citing Model Rule 1.2(c)] .. .---even if
the client's interest will be "adversely affected" by the withdrawal!
[citing Model Rule 1.16(b)(3) and 1.16(c) (requiring lawyer to con-
tinue representation when so ordered by a tribunal notwithstand-
ing good cause for withdrawal)] These rules are meant precisely to
resolve the "potential conflict between the lawyer's conscience and
the lawyer's duty to vigorously represent a client."
23
It may well be that, like many who have sought to teach the prin-
ciples of professional responsibility, Professor Lerman agrees with
the importance of the distinction between conduct permitted by a
code and conduct required by a lawyer's conscience. 24 If this is so,
however, it is not apparent from her Article, with its emphasis on
improving lawyers' professional conduct, not by "invite[ing] [them]
.. to take their own values into account," 25 but by enacting new,
more detailed rules, to be enforced by malpractice actions.
A final-for purposes of this comment, anyway-question sug-
gested by Professor Lerman's Article is whether the legal profession
21 See MODEL RULE 5.1.
22 See MODEL RULE 5.3.
23 Schneyer, supra note 12, at 736 (citing ABA CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT: THEIR DEVELOPMENT IN THE ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES 103 (1987).
24 The distinction is a-if not the-principal theme of the course in The Legal
Profession and Professional Responsibility at the University of Pennsylvania Law
School. Similarly, many others include in their teaching materials commentary by
moral philosophers on the relationship between a lawyer's role as defined by
professional criteria such as codes of conduct and by broader considerations. See,
e.g., G. Hazard & S. Koniak, The Law & Ethics of Lawyering (forthcoming 1990);
Postema, Self-Image, Integrity, and Professional Responsibility, in THE GOOD LAWYER (D.
Luban ed. 1983); T. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS: TEXT, READINGS, AND
DISCUSSION ToPIcs 167-93 (1985); Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral
Issues, reprinted in A KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (3d ed.
1989); see also COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 7, at 45-46; S. GILLERS &
R. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 407-16 (1989).
25 Schneyer, supra note 12, at 736.
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really is the assortment of liars and cheats she evidently believes it to
be.
There seems little doubt that this is her view of the profession.
At one point she states that her "Article does not purport to answer
the difficult question of how much deception of clients takes place
nor the question of what types of deception are typical."-26 But these
disavowals are belied by the rest of her Article. If she does not know
exactly "how much" deception takes place, she nevertheless does not
think it is only a little; and if she does not know what types of decep-
tion are "typical," she is nevertheless satisfied that some quite viru-
lent types are widespread.
Professor Lerman's general view of the legal profession is that it
is not a profession at all but a business, and, moreover, an especially
exploitative business. 27 The "engine," she says, "that drives [law-
yers]... is profit motivation." 28 She adds: "Lawyers' desire to earn
money does not distinguish them from anyone else in business. The
law business is like any other business, except that the lawyers are
exempt from many of the legal safeguards that are imposed on
merchants to deter them from taking advantage of their
customers."
29
One of the techniques by which the thus-exempted lawyers take
advantage of their customers is dishonest billing. "[D]eception" in
billing, Professor Lerman says, "is common." 30 "[P]adding of
wealthy clients' bills" is also "common."'" "[Miany lawyers' billing
practices are rough approximations at best."-32
Another technique is covering up mistakes. Indeed, "[o]ne of
the most common reasons that lawyers deceive clients is to avoid
having to disclose their mistakes." 3 3 "[L]awyers often lie in situa-
26 Lerman, supra note 1, at 665.
27 Others have expressed a similar if perhaps somewhat less drastic view. See,
e.g., G. HAZARD & D. RHODE, supra note 17, at 26 (reprinting M. LARSON, THE RISE OF
PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 56, 59 (1977) (while professions share
certain elements with business, "at least ideologically, [they] espouse anti-market
principles")); see also Goldberg, "Then and Now: 75 Years of Change", A.B.A. J., Jan.
1990, at 56 (describing changes in the legal profession and noting that "(1) [o]ne
sure sign that law had become big business was the emergence of megafirms": over
the last forty years, from from five firms with over 50 lawyers to over 287 firms; over
the last twelve years, from 47 firms with over 100 lawyers to 245 firms).
28 Lerman, supra note 1, at 672.
29 Id. at 672 n.49.
30 Id. at 720 n.253.
31 Id. at 712.
32 Id. at 749.
33 Id. at 725.
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tions in which the truth would work just as well.' '3 4 "Lawyers often
avoid speaking with their clients if they have not accomplished work
they promised to do, or if they have made errors they do not wish to
disclose."35 "Many lawyers do not consider what they characterize
as 'puffing' to be lying ....,,6
One gathers that Professor Lerman does not like lawyers. Not
only does she accept criticism of them without indicating any disa-
greement or qualification, but she generalizes from the criticism.
For example, after reporting one lawyer's "postulat[ion] that lawyers
enjoy the power that they have and exercise this power by blatant
dishonesty,"3 7 she adds, "This suggests that some lawyers gain ego
satisfaction from lying to others." 38 No doubt "some lawyers" do.
But more lawyers than members of other professions? One won-
ders, given Professor Lerman's disdain for the legal profession, why
she bothers. Why does she suppose that such a profession might
enact the rules she suggests, or if enacted, obey them? It seems
rather like suggesting that the fox should enact rules to limit its dep-
redations in the hen house.
Putting this query aside, what is the basis of Professor Lerman's
assertions of what is "common" practice by "many" lawyers? She
interviewed three law students who had worked in law firms3 9 and
twenty lawyers.40 Professor Lerman admits that these persons were
"not a random sample ... [and were] too few to be statistically sig-
nificant,"4 1 and that the data collected were "anecdotal in nature.' '42
She also admits that "[i]t is certainly possible that I talked with atypi-
cal lawyers from atypical firms, and that another set of interviews
would provide a different result," adding: "I have no doubt that
there are lawyers whose standards of integrity would not allow them
to deceive clients, even if others around them were doing so.
'4"
These admissions, however, seem pro forma; certainly they do not
lead her to soften in any way her condemnation of the profession.
When sweeping conclusions rest on a fragile base, more ques-
tions are raised than answered. Was Professor Lerman never told an
34 Id. at 738.
35 Id. at 755.
36 Id. at 721.
37 Id. at 738.
38 Id.
39 See id. at 703 n.186.
40 See id. at 703.
41 Id. at 704.
42 Id. at 664.
43 Id. at 759.
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anecdote of decent, even outstanding, conduct by another lawyer?
Did none of those she interviewed know, or know of, a lawyer who
for an honest fee firmly guided a business out of trouble; provided
wise counsel to parents of a child arrested for using drugs; won com-
pensation for an injured worker; or for no fee defended a prisoner
on death row? If she was told at least some anecdotes favorable to
lawyers, what weight did she give them? If she was never told any
such anecdote, did she inquire whether those she interviewed were
not only not a random sample of the profession but an embittered
handful? And what attempt did she make to verify their sweeping
condemnations before repeating them?
Professor Lerman characterizes her article as " 'casual empiri-
cism,' . . . an initial inquiry into an area that calls for a larger empiri-
cal study."44 One can agree with this characterization and yet
remain reserved about the importance of further empirical study of
lawyers' deception.
For one thing, there is a definitional difficulty. What sort of
"deception" should be investigated? Defining deception to include
conduct as varied as padding a bill,45 not telling a wife the beastly
things her husband says about her,46 and not discussing with a plain-
tiff the possibility that she may cry when questioned47 will at the very
least blur the focus of further research. If one puts this difficulty
aside, however, the question remains of the extent to which the fur-
ther research contemplated by Professor Lerman would improve the
legal profession. For all can agree that it needs improvement. There
are indeed dishonest lawyers-shockingly dishonest lawyers who
should not simply be sued for malpractice or disciplined but put in
prison.48
Two possible lines of empirical inquiry seem more promising
than research into the extent of lawyers' "deception." One of these
lines, moreover, is consistent with an observation by Professor
Lerman.
44 Id. at 664 n.14.
45 See id. at 709.
46 See id. at 677, n.72, 678, n.77.
47 See id. at 677 n.72.
48 For a recent report of lawyers fraudulently expanding and prolonging
litigation for the purpose of generating billable time-the very sort of conduct
condemned by Professor Lerman-see DeBenedictis, The Alliance, A.B.A. J., Dec.
1989, at 59; see also "Can a Tarnished Star Regain His Luster?" N.Y. Times, Feb. 25,
1990, at Cl, col. 1 (describing in the events leading to the bankruptcy of what was
once the nation's fourth largest firm, the "[cirunch came [when the firm's largest
client] claimed the firm was padding its legal bills").
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In the course of her article, Professor Lerman observes how the
"atmosphere" and "structure" of a law firm may affect whether a
lawyer behaves deceptively.4 9 This insight may be generalized to
include not only deception but all sorts of behavior. For without
question, law firms practice in different ways, which is to say, their
lawyers have different values - different concepts of what it means
to be a professional and of the appropriate relationship between
one's professional and personal standards. How are values transmit-
ted within a firm? How does a firm develop its particular culture,
and what causes that culture to be preserved or to change? The
same questions might be asked about the legal department of a cor-
poration or government agency.5" Empirical research to find 'the
answers to these questions would be welcome.
A second possible line of inquiry might concern education, of
both law students and practicing lawyers. A great deal of attention
has been devoted over the past few years to education in professional
responsibility. Casebooks, a hornbook, looseleaf services, video-
tapes-all have become available. " ' Has this made any difference?
What, if anything, do lawyers do differently because of what they
learned in their courses on professional responsibility? Surely some
teaching techniques have more impact than others. But which ones?
And how deep and lasting an impact?5 2 Again, answers would be
welcome.
The legal profession has been severely, and justly, criticized for
the gap between its pretensions and its performance.5 3 Many law-
49 See Lerman, supra note 1, at 743-44.
50 For an empirical study of the general values of lawyers in large firms, see
Nelson, Ideology, Practice, and Professional Autonomy: Social Values and Client Relationships
in the Large Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 503, 511-521 (1985). For a report of a survey
of women at the nation's largest law firms, see Women Say They Face Obstacles as Lawyers,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1989, § A21, cols. 1-3.
51 See, e.g., G. HAZARD & S. KONIAK, supra note 24; A. KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY (3d ed. 1989); T. SHAFFER, supra note 24 (casebook);
C. WOLFRAM, supra note 17 (hornbook); G. Hazard & W. Hodes, The Law of
Lawyering: A Handbook on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (with paper
supplements); Lawyers Manual on Professional Conduct (ABA/BNA) (looselea;
videotape may be obtained from, among others, the American Bar Association and
CCH, Professional Responsibility for Lawyers:, A Guided Course (forthcoming
1990).
52 For a collection of references debating the efficacy of legal education, see G.
HAZARD & D. RHODE, supra note 17, at 464-65; see also Schwartz, Comment, 37 STAN. L.
REV. 653, 658 (1985) (commenting on Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37
STAN. L. REV. at 589, and expressing reserved hope that the Model Rules may provoke
dialogue that will heighten lawyers' moral sensitivity).
53 See generally Rhode, supra note 52, at 589. Concerning the inadequate delivery
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yers acknowledge the force of this criticism and are troubled, as Pro-
fession Lerman is troubled, about the state of their profession.
54
Some-the author of this Comment, at least-will think that Profes-
sor Lerman has painted with too broad, and too dark, a brush. But if
she has, that will do no harm. Indeed, her article may be welcomed.
For quite apart from whether her suggested new rules have, or
should have, any future, she has raised, in provocative terms, the
broader question of how to improve professional conduct. To the
extent that her article encourages research that provides some
answers to that question and thereby lights the way to constructive
change, it will perform a valuable service.
of legal services, see G. HAZARD & D. RHODE, supra note 17, at 310-439; on
inadequate maintenance of professional standards, see id. at 440-505.
54 For the "official" or "establishment" expression of concern, see generally
COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 7.
